

THE GRAMSCI MONUMENT- NEWSPAPER



"A periodical, like a newspaper, a book, or any other medium of didactic expression that is aimed at a certain level of the reading or listening public, cannot satisfy everyone equally; not everyone will find it useful to the same degree. The important thing is that it serve as a stimulus for everyone; after all, no publication can replace the thinking mind."
Antonio Gramsci
(Prison Notebook 8)





www.gramsci-monument.com

August 30th, 2013 - Forest Houses, Bronx, NY

The Gramsci Monument-Newspaper is part of the "Gramsci Monument", an artwork by Thomas Hirschhorn, produced by Dia Art Foundation in co-operation with Erik Farmer and the Residents of Forest Houses

POWERFUL WORDS

button from day of MLK Jr.'s "I Have A Dream Speech"



FROM ROBIN D. G. KELLEY

at the "Gramsci Monument" on August 28, 2013

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
Bronx, NY 10456

Friday
Partly Cloudy

82 °F | °C

Precipitation: 10%
Humidity: 65%
Wind: 9 mph

Temperature Precipitation Wind



"EMPIRE STATE OF MIND" BY

ROBIN D. G. KELLEY

Empire State of Mind

by ROBIN D.G. KELLEY

"half of y'all won't make it"

—Jay-Z and Alicia Keys, "Empire State of Mind"

In the face of creeping disfranchisement, unbridled corporate power, growing poverty, an expanding police state, 2.3 million people in cages, vigilantes and cops taking our children's lives, a presidential policy of assassination-by-drone, global environmental disaster, attacks on reproductive rights, a war on trade unions, a tidal wave of foreclosures, and entrenched racism camouflaged beneath a post-racial myth, why do we care if Harry Belafonte and Shawn "Jay-Z" Carter have "beef"? Do social movements need Mr. Carter's money or power or influence? Is justice a matter of charity or wealth? So what if Carter believes—as he retorted in response to Belafonte's skewering of navel-gazing black celebrities—"my presence is charity"?

Let me say at the outset that I am not interested in spats between celebrities or on expending precious energy on conflict-resolution for the Negro one-percent. Anyone familiar with the dictionary definition of "charity" will find the statement ridiculous, just as anyone familiar with Jay-Z's philanthropic work will wonder why he would say such a thing. He has been a high-profile giver: he and his mother started the John Carter Foundation ten years ago to help fund college-bound at-risk youth; he tossed a million dollars into the Red Cross's coffers after Hurricane Katrina; he is a partner in the Global Citizen Tickets Initiative—the brainchild of the Global Poverty Project meant to hip pop music fans to world poverty and compel them to act (via sharing on social media, writing elected officials, donating money) while dropping big bucks on concert tickets. And there was "The Diary of Jay-Z: Water For Life," the 2006 MTV documentary that raised awareness of Africa's water crisis. Carter met with policy makers, advocates, and poor, water-starved families in Angola and South Africa, and committed to building 1,000 clean water pumps in Africa. Two years later, the United Nations honored his work with a

special humanitarian award.

Does this mean Belafonte was wrong? Or Jay misspoke? Or that we need to place 'Hova's' philanthropy and activism on a ledger against Bruce Springsteen's, the celebrity Belafonte deemed more socially responsible? What does any of this do to advance a truly progressive agenda?

Focusing on the *personal* obscures what is really at stake: ideas, ideology, the nature of change, the realities of power, and the evisceration of our critical faculties under the veil of corporate celebrity culture. I use corporate here not as an epithet but as an expression of the structural dimensions of how celebrity is made and its ideological function. Celebrities endorse products; like any commodity, they have become "brands." They may say and do very nice, uplifting, philanthropic things, but rarely do celebrities stand against the policies and ideas of neoliberalism and U. S. Empire. More often than not, they embody the ideology of neoliberalism (valuing wealth, free markets, privatization over human needs) and Empire (U.S. military and economic dominance over the world).

Words and deeds of high-profile individuals do matter, but too often we pay attention to the wrong words and the wrong deeds. Returning to Mr. Carter's reply, it is what he says immediately after his charity line that should concern us. Applying his claim—that greatness alone is in-and-of itself a magnanimous gift—to the President, he adds: "Whether [Obama] does anything, the hope that he provides for a nation, and outside of America is enough. Just being who he is. You're the first black president. If he speaks on any issue or anything he should be left alone."

That Mr. Carter believes this is less important than the fact that his "brand" promotes it, and I'd venture to say that most African-Americans fundamentally accept its logic. The mere fact that Obama is the first black president, so the argument goes, should grant him immunity from criticism. The relentless attacks on Cornel West, Tavis Smiley, and others for their relentless critique of the Obama administration conform to this logic. Rather than address their specific criticisms on their own terms, detractors dismiss West and Smiley by repeating the well-worn claim that they are motivated by personal slights or potential monetary gain, blame an intransigent right-wing Congress for Obama's worst policies (foreign and domestic), respond to criticisms with a laundry list of accomplishments, or simply assert that critics of the president are "haters," race traitors, who fail to appreciate the historic significance of a black man in the White House.

The idea that the President transcends all worldly criticism corresponds with a different sort of "Empire State of Mind." Empires dating back to Egypt, Rome, Ancient China and Japan have depended on an "imperial cult," the notion that an emperor is to be worshipped as a messiah or a demigod. Even modern empires, like the U.S., often fall back on hero worship, adoration of strength and might over the rule of law and justice. This is why cops and soldiers are "heroes" and dissenters and the civil disobedient are troublemakers or enemies of the state. The cult of Obama has the added dimension of being the tale of a singular black man overcoming historic obstacles, breaking the color line and achieving the highest office in the land. Such representation masks the fact that it wasn't his achievements but *our* achievements, *our* tireless mobilization on his behalf, the work of nameless millions who elected him to office to serve the people. We have an obligation in a democracy to hold government accountable to the rule of law (that includes international law) and to protect the interests of the whole of the people.

And what about deeds? I find it remarkable that Jay-Z's four little words could set off global outrage, but revelations that Rocawear, the Hip Hop apparel company he co-founded with producer Damon Dash, employed sweatshop labor barely registered a blip in the black blogosphere. Ten years ago, anti-sweatshop activists revealed that Rocawear, along with Sean Combs's "Sean John" label, contracted with Southeast Textiles International S. A. (SETISA) in Choloma, Honduras, to manufacture their very expensive clothing lines. SETISA sewers earned between 75 and 98 cents an hour, worked 11 to 12 hour shifts with no overtime, and had excessive production goals (T-shirt makers, for example, had to complete a little over 18 shirts per hour, and they could not leave until they met their quota). Talking was prohibited. Permission from a supervisor was required for bathroom breaks. Drinking water (found to be contaminated with fecal matter) was rationed. All employees were subjected to body searches, and female employees were required to take pregnancy tests. Those who attempted to unionize were fired. After refuting reports, Combs was ultimately pressured into making some improvements in factory conditions, but Carter had little to say and never issued a public apology. In 2007, Carter sold the rights to Rocawear to Iconix Brand Group for the princely sum of \$204 million, while retaining his stake in the company and overseeing marketing, licensing, and product development.

If we praise celebrities for wealth accumulation, then Rocawear is an unmitigated success. Jay-Z has done what most successful entrepreneurs do in the age of neoliberalism—seized upon the massively oppressive labor conditions produced by free trade policies, the creation of U.S.-backed free trade zones, deregulation, and the weakening of international labor standards.

And why not? Capitalists want to "live life colossal." *Milton Friedman Baby!* Then again, who wants to tweet that their favorite celebrity made millions off of sweated labor, thereby perpetuating global poverty? Knowing fans tend to look the

Enter MTV and the release of "The Diary of Jay-Z: Water For Life," following on the heels of Rocawear's sweatshop revelations. I doubt it was a cynical ploy to defuse the controversy, mainly because for the Jay-Z consumer there was no controversy. His brand escaped pretty much unscathed. And yet, while Carter's concern for the 1.2 billion people without access to clean water is genuine, the film's explanation of the crisis is problematic. "Water for Life" blames civil war and the disruptions of military violence, urbanization, and poverty, and suggests that philanthropy and visionary entrepreneurs can solve the problem by providing clean water pumps and digging wells. How so many Africans became "poor" in the first place, the legacy of colonialism, not to mention water privatization, don't really figure in the story. When asked about

privatization at a U.N. press conference upon the film's release, Carter appeared oblivious: "that's just bureaucracy, I don't have any expertise in that." He didn't know if water was being privatized, but he did notice that in the houses he visited, the families "paid fifty cents a bucket for [water]." He then went on to praise his long-time sponsor Coca-Cola for providing money for play pumps in Southern Africa (small manual merry-go-rounds that pump water as children play). At the time, Coke was targeted by protestors in India and Colombia for depleting scarce local water sources for its bottling plants, and releasing toxic waste water into the ground, damaging farm land and leaving residents with a variety of skin and stomach ailments.

To be clear, I am in no way criticizing Shawn Carter for lacking a sophisticated critique of the ravages of privatization. To expect as much is unfair, unrealistic, and beside the point. Most Americans share his view; neoliberal logic normalizing Empire and its exploitative practices is today's common sense. However, it is the *use of his brand* to sell this new common sense, to promote corporate interests and obscure the real sources of inequality, that matter.

Alicia Keys – Home Wrecker?

Ironically, it has been the Alicia Keys brand—the angelic half of the Empire State duo—that has shown a particularly egregious disregard for human rights. On July 4th of this year, Keys performed in Tel Aviv, Israel, in spite of urgent pleas by Palestinian and Israeli activists, human rights advocates, and nearly 16,000 petitioners from around the world, to respect the global boycott of Israel for its illegal occupation of the West Bank and apartheid policies toward Palestinians. Personal appeals from writer Alice Walker and Archbishop Desmond Tutu did nothing to dissuade Keys or her handlers from accepting the invitation. In response, she issued the following statement: "I look forward to my first visit to Israel. Music is a universal language that is meant to unify audiences in peace and love, and that is the spirit of our show."

The statement is as ridiculous and ingenuous as "My presence is charity." How can music unify an audience when policies of occupation and apartheid exclude the vast majority of Palestinians? What good are homilies about love and peace in a land where Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are prohibited from even entering Israel, contained by a massive concrete wall, economically starved, and living under military occupation? Where thousands of Palestinians are locked away in Israeli prisons—including hundreds of minors convicted of throwing rocks at tanks and well-armed soldiers and settlers? Where Israel continues to build Jewish settlements in the West Bank, displacing Palestinians, demolishing their homes, uprooting their olive trees—all in violation of international law. Where, on more than one occasion, Palestinian mothers were forced to give birth on the side of the road or watch their severely ill children die in their arms for want of emergency care because they were held up at an Israeli checkpoint. Where the apartheid wall has turned a fifteen-minute walk to school into a two-hour ordeal for thousands of young children. For young Palestinians living in Israel who are not incarcerated, few could afford the \$62.00 ticket to hear Keys. Nearly half of all Palestinians in Israel live in poverty. Most are legally excluded from residing in non-Arab communities based on their "social unsuitability," attend severely underfunded schools, and are denied government employment.

The point of the non-violent global boycott, of course, is to apply economic pressure on Israel to change these policies: to end the occupation, dismantle the "apartheid" wall which violates international law; recognize the fundamental rights of all Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel and other non-Jews for full equality, and grant the right to return, as stipulated by United

Nations resolution 194. The boycott is an act of tough love to achieve justice through peaceful means. Alicia Keys' concert, on the other hand, served to legitimize and normalize Israeli policies of violence, occupation, incarceration, segregation, and settlement. Keys and her handlers knew this, as they were inundated with materials from organizations supporting the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions movement (BDS)—including the U.S. Campaign to End the Israeli Occupation, Jewish Voice for Peace, and Boycott from Within. Activists hoped that Keys' role as lead supporter of "Keep a Child Alive," an NGO dedicated to helping HIV-infected children in Africa and India, would make her more sensitive to the lives of Palestinian children. The organization's Chief Executive Officer, Peter Twyman, and co-founder Leigh Blake received pages upon pages of material documenting the daily abuses of children at the hands of the Israeli military and settlers.

Rifat Kassis of Defence for Children International Palestine, and Shatha Odeh of the Health Work Committees, submitted a powerful [letter appealing to Keys](#) to cancel, outlining in devastating detail how the occupation and Israeli policies have affected Palestinian children. They reveal that since 2003, some 8,000 Palestinian children as young as 12 have been arrested, interrogated (often without access to parents and legal counsel), and detained by the Israeli army and prosecuted in military courts—some held in solitary confinement. (With a 98% conviction rate, it is no surprise that confessions obtained by coercion are rarely thrown out by military judges.) They discuss how military checkpoints and the apartheid wall have become barriers to basic and emergency medical care. And they point out that the blockade of Gaza "is the single greatest contributor to the endemic and long-lasting poverty, deterioration of health care, infant mortality, disease, chronic malnutrition and preventable deaths of children. Palestinian children in Gaza lack access to clean water, health care and are scarred by repeated Israeli military offensives and the constant fear of impending attacks."

Keys's decision to perform was made not out of ignorance or an abiding love for Israel or a personal mission to jump-start the peace process. It was about getting paid. The Alicia Keys brand stood to lose financially and likely feared retaliation from pro-Zionist forces. Indeed, her decision to violate the boycott earned her kudos from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and its allies, who in turn placed a flurry of publicity pieces praising her "courage" in the face of BDS "bullies." But as with Shawn Carter, I don't blame Keys personally, nor do I question her humanitarian commitments. Alicia Keys is a corporate entity driven by profits and propelled by shareholders (backers and fans). Just as Jay-Z lovers ignored Rocawear's callous use of sweated labor, Keys's followers have quietly supported her Israel foray. The sad truth is that 16,000 signatures is nothing against the Keys-AIPAC alliance, and most Americans see Palestine through the official lens of the Israeli government and U.S. policy.

Had Keys paid a visit to Atta Muhammad Atta Sabah, the 12-year-old Palestinian boy shot by an Israeli soldier in Jalazoun refugee camp in the West Bank just six weeks prior to her concert, perhaps she might have changed her mind. She would have met a small, bright-eyed boy paralyzed from the waist down with holes in his liver, lungs, pancreas and spleen, and angry parents resigned to the reality that their son will never see justice. He was shot while attempting to retrieve his school bag. What if she had driven to Southern Israel to the Naqab desert and met a few of the 40,000 Bedouin whom the government plans to forcibly remove from their ancestral homeland to make way for Jewish settlements? And what if she decided to spend a few days in the West Bank after her Tel Aviv performance, meeting and playing for kids in Ramallah, Hebron, Nablus, Bethlehem, East Jerusalem, touring the refugee camps, listening to their stories? She might have been passing through Hebron on July 9th, the day Israeli soldiers detained five-year-old Wadi' Maswadeh for allegedly throwing a stone at a settler's car. When Wadi's father, Karam, complained about the arrest and treatment of his son, he was handcuffed and blindfolded and taken, along with his terrified, crying son, to the Palestinian Authority police. They were both eventually released.

Keys never met Atta Muhammad Atta Sabah or Wadi' Maswadeh or any of the Palestinian children growing up in a world of refugee camps, home demolitions, settler and military violence, displacement, economic deprivation, and educational policies designed to literally deny their existence. The Keys brand could ill afford to expose their star to such "negativity," lest she walk away from the machine. But here is the real tragedy: the Keys machine was never compelled to apologize or even mildly acknowledge that something is rotten in the state of Israel.

The sad truth is that Keys's romantic involvement with producer Swizz Beatz, apparently while he was still married, was considered infinitely more scandalous than playing Tel Aviv. Twitter and Facebook and gossip columns were abuzz with accusations that Alicia Keys is a home wrecker. By contrast, neither her fan base nor the Alicia Keys "haters" had much to say about the wrecking of Palestinian homes. (This year alone, Israel announced plans to build another 2,000+ settlement houses in the West Bank.) Equally disheartening is the Black Entertainment Television (BET) poll that 59% of its on-line readers support Keys's decision to violate the boycott. Of course, it is likely that AIPAC operatives posing as BET on-line readers skewed the results, but not by much. Most African-Americans simply don't know a lot about Palestine, and many devout Christians among us tend to buy the argument that defending the State of Israel is tantamount to defending the Holy Land. Few vocal critics of New York's "stop and frisk" policy, for example, know that the Israeli military version of "stop and frisk" in the West Bank means entering Palestinian homes in the middle of the night, forcing families out of bed, photographing all the boys and young men and taking their information. These routine acts are not part of ongoing investigations or require probable cause, but an official policy of surveillance and intimidation. Such outrageous policies should have generated some 1.6 million signatures rather than 16,000.

Let me repeat: I am not arguing that Jay-Z or Alicia Keys or any corporate mega-star is personally responsible for the kind of political and ethical blinders endemic to what has become a national corporate consciousness, an Empire State of Mind. Corporate celebrities, or rather their brands, are merely the messengers. The responsibility for shedding those blinders and developing an informed, global, ethical critique of materialism, militarism, exploitation and dispossession, rests with us. The absence of a broad-based, progressive black movement has not only opened the floodgates for the spread of neoliberalism as the new common sense, but it has severely hampered the ability of too many African Americans to think critically and globally about oppression and inequality—though, to be sure, this problem is not unique to the black community. Our romance with corporate celebrity culture merely fuels a persistent belief that the *black* one percent are our natural allies, our role models, our hope for the future. Many of us embrace black millionaires and billionaires—the P-Diddy's, Russell Simmons's, Jay-Z's, and Oprah's of the world—as embodiments of "our" wealth, without ever questioning the source of their wealth, the limits of philanthropy, or the persistence of poverty among the remaining 99%.


In the end, the difference between, say, Harry Belafonte, Danny Glover, and Alice Walker and the Jay-Zs and Alicia Keys of the world is not generational. It is not a simple-minded division between Old School Civil Rights and the Hip Hop Generation. Before Belafonte, Glover, and Walker became "celebrities," they were activists first. They joined social movements and risked their bodies and futures before they even had careers. And in this respect, they have more in *common* with Hip Hop artists/activists such as Yasiin Bey, Talib Kweli, Boots Riley, Rebel Diaz, Chuck D, Rosa Clemente, Immortal Technique, Twice Thou, Lupe Fiasco, Keny Arkana, and others. Their movement work was never about achieving wealth or success, but a commitment to fighting for a world where power rests with the people, not an oligarchy; a world where oppression, exploitation, dispossession, and caging of all people—irrespective of color, gender, nationality, sexual identity—is a thing of the past; a world where such corporate-backed philanthropy is unnecessary, and one need not buy high-priced concert tickets to fight oppression.

Robin D. G. Kelley, who teaches at UCLA, is the author of The Onion: The Life and Times of an American Original (2009) and most recently Africa Speaks, America Answers: Modern Jazz in Revolutionary Times (2012).


Audience to talk of Robin D. G. Kelley at the "Gramsci Monument" on August 28, 2013




March on Washington on August 28, 1963





REMEMBERING 1963



Installation view of ANDY WARHOL/SUPERNOVA: Stars, Deaths, and Disasters, 1962–1964, with “Race Riot” and “Pink Race Riot” by Andy Warhol from 1963. Photo: Gene Pittman.



"Little Race Riot" (1964) by Andy Warhol



REMEMBERING 1963



Andy Warhol wearing the "Race Riot" silk-screen on a homemade sandwich board at the entrance to The Factory, NYC 1964 Copyright 2010 William John Kennedy

BIOGRAPHY OF CHRISTINE BUCI-GLUCKSMANN

Ms. Buci-Glucksmann will deliver the "Gramsci Seminar" on Saturday, August 31, 2013 at 3:30 PM



Christine Buci-Glucksmann is a philosopher and professor emerita at the University of Paris VIII. She is the author of many articles, exhibition catalogues, and books, including *The Madness of Vision: On Baroque Aesthetics* (Ohio University Press, 2013); *Philosophie de l'ornement : D'Orient en Occident* (Galilée, 2008); *Esthétique de l'éphémère* (Galilée, 2003); *L'Esthétique du temps au Japon: Du zen au virtuel* (Galilée, 2001); *Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity* (SAGE Publications Ltd, 1994); and *Gramsci and the State* (Lawrence and Wishart 1980). She is currently working on a catalogue for the exhibition "The Metamorphoses of the Virtual: 100 Years of Art and Freedom," an independent pavilion at the 2013 Venice Biennale.

DIGRAPHE

CHRISTINE BUCI-GLUCKSMANN

GRAMSCI ET L'ÉTAT

POUR UNE THÉORIE MATÉRIALISTE DE LA PHILOSOPHIE



FAYARD 3925

CHRISTINE

BUCI-GLUCKSMANN

THE MADNESS
OF VISION

TRANSLATED BY DOROTHY Z. BAKER




SERIES IN CONTINENTAL THOUGHT

AND
THE STATE
Christine Buci-Glucksmann



ESSAY BY CHRISTINE BUCCI-GLUCKSMANN



April 1937

Time of Sadness

My fear is a weakness which only concerns myself; my death is everyone's business (Bertolt Brecht, *Me-Ti, Buch der Wendungen*).

He died very early. What pains he had to take to get hold of even some of the books in which humanity has stored part of its experiences! . . . He was badly fed, and even this food was hard to find. What difficulties he had in making contact with those whom he wished to help and whose support he himself needed! He was pursued, so that whole countries – half of Europe – stood between him and them (Brecht).

He thought in the heads of others, and others thought in his own. That is what true thought is (Brecht).

Introduction

Towards a Political-Theoretical Reading of Gramsci

I

Both the large number of recent works on Gramsci published in France, and the political issues these involve, make it necessary for me to spell out my own point of view right at the start. This book is not designed as a general introduction to Gramsci's entire work, nor as an 'interpretation' based simply on the texts themselves, which could at most present Gramsci as a 'great intellectual'. It is rather a political-theoretical reading of the *Prison Notebooks* as these relate to Gramsci's active political practice in the years 1914 to 1926, and the strategic point of departure is always the state.

Athos Lisa, in his reminiscences of Gramsci,¹ recalls how 'he never posed abstract problems that were separate and divorced from everyday life'. This ability to establish a critical and dialectical relationship between theory and practice, with a somewhat contemptuous attitude towards any kind of pedantic intellectualism, should not give rise to misunderstanding. If politics formed 'the unity of Gramsci's life', as Togliatti liked to put it, this was a politics that demanded the greatest possible knowledge of history, philosophy, science and culture. It had nothing in common with short-sighted pragmatism or empiricism. In prison, Riboldi called Gramsci a 'walking library', and this was also the man who could spend hours talking to workers in the occupied factories of Turin in 1920. The same man, again, who had struggled since his earliest youth for the working class to gain a philosophical and cultural education as an instrument of liberation.

In December 1917, for example, in that city where 'the proletarians want to rule', Gramsci defended against certain Socialist Party leaders the need for a 'cultural association' with class aims that would complement economic and political action. 'There are philosophical, religious and moral problems that political and economic action

partners in dialogue (from Lenin back to Marx or Machiavelli), while always keeping an open character that preserves it from any kind of dogmatism or scholasticism. In a most important fragment that opens the immense *Notebook 4* (1930–32), Gramsci remarks that Marx's work does not contain any systematic presentation of his world-view, and that it is necessary to elicit this on the basis of the sum total of his intellectual work, including its implicit elements. In this perspective, 'search for the *Leitmotiv*, for the rhythm of the thought as it develops, should be more important than that for single casual affirmations and isolated aphorisms'.¹² This is a difficult task, involving the isolation of invariant elements, the grasping of different turning-points, the deepening of one and the same problematic. These same guidelines can be applied to the whole of the *Notebooks*, as long as a certain precaution is observed.

The form of 'notes', which Gramsci always conceived of as 'material still in the course of elaboration, and thus provisional', similarly delimits a new practice of philosophy (Althusser), very close to what Brecht called 'the grand method', 'intervening thought'. Gramsci's work involves a kind of dialecticization of different realms of knowledge which definitively breaks with all distinctions into isolated activities, instances that are labelled 'economic', 'political', 'literary', 'cultural', etc. Each note functions as an intervention in thought, reproducing, collecting, shifting and rectifying the others. Hence the extraordinary richness of his thought, and hence, too, the failure of any thematic approach indifferent to the constant restructurings of his statements and the real problems that lie behind them.¹³

If we are to investigate this multiple, incisive and spiral writing that makes up a text, it is necessary to break with the idea of a single and linear order of exposition. The underlying coherence of Gramsci's thought is not the product of principled deduction proceeding along 'chains of reasoning' (in the Cartesian sense) or in a thematic order (in the false 'literary' sense). In the light of modern mathematical discoveries and contemporary reflection on writing (e.g. the works of Jacques Derrida), it is possible to compare Gramsci's fragmentary and multiple writing to 'a tabular space with infinite ways in': a structure of networks.¹⁴ Because Gramsci never wrote a 'book', because he always stubbornly refused to make 'a systematic presentation' of Marxism, in favour of a certain political Socratism (in V. Gerratana's expression), these words of Derrida's could well be applied to him:

typology and functions of its forms of speech, a completely different question is thereby obscured:

Whenever the question of language flares up in one form or another, this means that a whole series of other questions are in the process of being raised: the formation and expansion of a leading class, the reorganization of a cultural hegemony, the need to establish a closer relation between the intellectuals and the masses.¹⁸

The circle is once again bent into a spiral. Language questions philosophy, because Marxist philosophy must also be a criticism of language. Gramsci the writer practises a multiple writing, breaking down the barriers of discipline, because politically he practises culture in a different way. Given these conditions, and taking into account the protracted interval over which the *Notebooks* were written (six years: 1929–35), the many returns to one note, and the different and corrected versions of the same text, it seemed impossible here, too, to adopt a linear method of exposition. This book must also be read as a spiral; one and the same question or concept forms the object of several different expositions and approaches, as a function of the path traversed and the fields touched upon: politics, philosophy, history. Just to take one example, the 'philosophical' section is placed here at the end, in Part Five. And yet it is already present throughout our analysis, both implicitly and explicitly, at all levels. But since Marxist philosophy is not formed by a task of ontological foundation such as is characteristic of all speculative philosophies, nor with a merely epistemological intention, since it involves an organic relationship to politics, no preliminary exposition can take account of its mode of operation. This premeditated refusal, of course, prohibits any 'humanist' reading of Gramsci's philosophy: this is at work in his writings on politics, culture, on the relationship between intellectuals and state, and on the withering away of the state. These are all objects which may not appear those of philosophy, but which carry with them Gramsci's true philosophical project: a theory of the apparatus of philosophical hegemony (APH) and a new relation between philosophy, culture and politics that we intend to refer to as a *gnoseology of politics*. This forms a kind of referential basis for an approach to the question of the cultural revolution in the developed capitalist countries.

III

An approach to philosophy of this kind starts out with a special

The subject of writing does not exist, if what is meant by this is some sovereign solitude of the writer. The subject of writing is a system of relations between the levels of the magical bloc, of psyche, society, and the world. Nowhere on this stage can the simplicity of the classical subject be found.¹⁵

Crossing as he does different levels of language (philosophy, journalism, politics), mingling them in a work without end, Gramsci the writer already transgresses the traditional divisions, the ideologies of closed knowledge, a certain type of division of intellectual labour that is still in existence today. This breakdown of the divisions between disciplines frees philosophy from its monovalency, in the same liberation already conducted by Lenin. It is in this sense that Gramsci the writer is already a political Gramsci.

Here we find a strange affinity between philosophy and language, where each gives access to the other. For from the time of his studies of linguistics at Turin university, studies which were quickly jettisoned on his discovery and experience of the working class and of journalism, Gramsci always maintained a particularly sharp feeling for the ideological and material plurality of language, for what Roland Barthes has called 'the density of a language'. In the sense in which languages are 'more or less thick, operating to stratify a subject':

How many social worlds does each individual belong to? Doesn't everyone strive to unify his own concept of the world, which is composed of heterogenous fragments of fossilized cultures?¹⁶

A personal echo of the young Sardinian on his arrival at university in Turin, and his practical experience of bilingualism, which he so often returned to:

My mother is Sardinian . . . [but] my cultural formation is basically Italian and this is my world here.¹⁷

But this is also the symptom of a far deeper reality, concerning the relations between language and society, the insertion of language in the reality of social relations, including their imaginary aspect. In 1918 Gramsci threw himself into a struggle within the Socialist Party against those who wanted the party to lead a campaign in favour of Esperanto, as the 'linguistic expression of the international battle'. This same resistance to any reduction of language to an artificial tongue governs Gramsci's entire criticism of pragmatism and philosophical formalism in his *Prison Notebooks*. For as soon as a society begins to question the

objective that makes it conceivable and possible, that of the state. Paradoxically enough, this subject, however central, has been discussed very little. We can contrast the place reserved to it with that for other 'themes' which have inspired dozens of works: the intellectuals, culture, the criticism of Croce, hegemony, the 'philosophy of praxis', etc. In this sense, the state really is repressed in interpretations of Gramsci.

Conversely, however, to give a privileged place to the state obliges one to cover immediately and systematically the great political questions raised for Gramsci by the national and international conjuncture of class struggle in the first thirty years of the twentieth century: the crisis of the liberal state, the nature of fascism and the fascist state, the novelty of the Soviet state and its evolution in the USSR, the experience of workers' councils, and the problems of the socialist state. Without forgetting the pivotal point of Gramsci's analysis: the astonishing 'resistance of the state apparatus' that is specific to Western societies in the developed capitalist countries. So resistant, one might say, that it forced Gramsci to reflect on a new road to socialism in this type of society, where the 'organizational reserves' of the dominant classes in periods of crisis are always stronger than one would possibly suspect.

A procedure of this kind makes it necessary to locate Gramsci in history, his history, his own time, in order to 'de-ideologize' our analysis and measure the real importance of his concepts today. But care must be taken not to fall into the trap of a reductionist reading, the result of confusion between 'legitimate historicization' and 'historicism'. For at a certain level, this 'historicization' may perhaps not teach us very much about the contemporary relevance of Gramsci. In no case should it come to substitute for that other vital analysis that has priority: the theoretical task.

Certain people see such historicizing as tantamount to transforming an astonishingly living writer into an obsolete fossil, since Gramsci's time is naturally not our own. But is that of Lenin? To be quite plain, if certain of Gramsci's concepts appeared in a very particular historical context (e.g. the concepts of hegemony, hegemonic apparatus, integral state, war of position), this in no way means that they are reducible to a simple expression of these conditions. Against this historicist flattening, so rightly combated by Louis Althusser, it is always necessary to recall a fundamental truth. Marxist concepts, as scientific concepts, rise above their place of origin. Were this not so, then all the basic principles of Lenin's own procedure (the theory and practice of class struggle, the nature of imperialism) would become simply empirico-historical rules.

presuppose without the economic and political organizations being specifically able to discuss these.² In a vocabulary that had yet to break with its Crocean origins, and is inspired by a specific kind of revolutionary tension that marked the young Gramsci, he added: 'Socialism is an integral vision of life; it has a philosophy, a faith, and a morality.' The formulation is certainly inadequate, and suffused with idealism, but its political orientation is clear enough. Gramsci is seeking a revolutionary Marxism, a philosophy that is also a politics.

Culture, as Gramsci conceived it at that time, in no way meant some kind of encyclopedic knowledge which left people disarmed and passive: 'This form of culture is really dangerous, particularly for the proletariat.'³ As opposed to that 'weak and colourless' intellectualism, true culture involves the transformation of reality, via 'the attainment of a higher awareness, with the aid of which one succeeds in understanding one's own historical value, one's own function in life, one's own rights and obligations'.⁴

It was under the triple patronage of Novalis, Vico and the Enlightenment, 'this magnificent revolution', that culture had come more to be identified with criticism of society, its ideas and its ways of life: 'It was through a critique of capitalist civilization that the unified consciousness of the proletariat was or is still being formed.'⁵

If we listen carefully to this young Gramsci, we can understand how a certain idealism, demanding as it did a total transformation of society, could find in Leninism, as it successively appropriated this politically and theoretically, the qualitative threshold which would make possible a new practice of politics, one breaking with that of the Second International. But we can also listen to him from a further point of view: thinking is a behaviour of men in relation to their fellows, a behaviour that must be correct.

In this first struggle on the cultural front, therefore, Gramsci is anticipating above all the education of the working class, its 'mass ideological preparation'. But he is also seeking to resolve the question of the intellectuals, who 'represent a dead weight on our movement' unless they find 'specific tasks adequate to their abilities'. In the framework provided by the intended 'cultural association', the proletariat could discuss everything that concerned the workers' movement, while the 'traditional intellectuals' would find the wherewithal to 'put their intellectualism, their faculty of intelligence, to the test'.⁶

This was in 1917, but some thirteen years later, when Gramsci wrote in prison his major texts on the party and the intellectuals (*Notebook 4*,

1930-32), he did not forget the original motivations of his youth and the entire course he had travelled as a Communist leader. The modern Prince, i.e. the vanguard political party, had among its other functions that of 'welding together the organic intellectuals of a group and the traditional intellectuals'. As a historical experimenter in philosophy, it is the place where 'the traditional intellectual can become organic, by becoming a political intellectual' (*Notebook 4*, 49).

Understanding Gramsci involves a self-criticism for this type of revolutionary intellectual, who as Brecht put it, arouses the suspicion of the proletariat: 'The man who while in no way being himself subject to an intolerable oppression *opts freely* for something that he sees as preferable: he *chooses* revolution.'⁷ Proceeding in such a new way, these intellectuals must take cognizance of their sociological position, their real and contradictory insertion in social relations. In this way they can overcome their characteristic isolation, unite with the masses, and reunify in their own intellectual and political practice what every class society divides: philosophy and politics, culture and the progressive and revolutionary forces. 'Reading Gramsci' consequently means taking up a standpoint from which his political positions and the internal logic of his thinking become intelligible: the standpoint of class struggle in politics, but also in theory itself. So as to remove any ambiguity here, what we mean by this is that an analysis of Gramsci as political leader is inseparable from tracing the specifically theoretical and philosophical dimension of his thought, and vice versa. But this thought must be freed from all idealist interpretations, if we are to obtain the preliminary conditions for demonstrating its revolutionary and Leninist dimension.

First condition. Whatever Gramsci's differences were with Togliatti in 1926, or with the International in 1929 (after its 'left turn' following the Sixth Congress and Tenth Plenum: the theses of social-fascism and 'class against class'), his work is always located quite fundamentally in the history of the workers' movement, without which it remains simply unintelligible. To repeat, it is quite illusory to separate Gramsci from his time, from his links with Lenin, and from his Communist political practice, so that the end-product is an *in camera* interpretation of his political thought. In prison, Gramsci's debates were not simply with Croce or Machiavelli, but also, and above all, with Lenin, Bukharin, and Trotsky, not to mention the fragment explicitly devoted to Stalin, and everything else that remains implicit in his prison writings. It is in fact by way of these theoretical filters, these more or less conflictual footholds, that Gramsci's overall philosophical project takes shape: the

recasting of Marxist philosophy, on the basis of a return to Marx's own philosophical revolution, and a philosophical retranslation of Lenin's revolutionary practice. To put it bluntly, analysis of Gramsci as the 'theorist of the revolution in the West' appears to me dependent on the patient and meticulous work of restoring Gramsci to his position in the context of the overall Marxist culture of his time: Lenin, above all (and there is a lot to say on this subject), but also Bukharin (who played a very important role), Trotsky, and further back Rosa Luxemburg and all the debates within the Second International. This preliminary analysis is needed, to see in what way Gramsci makes a contribution of the first order to reflection on the problems of the 'Stalin era'. Any other procedure ultimately seems rather unserious, even derisory.

Second condition. The effects of this type of method have to be seen at work in the internal interpretation of Gramsci's work. Here, once again, it is necessary to be clear, and to break with a whole series of myths, approximations and constantly repeated errors.

Valentino Gerratana was quite right to note how Gramsci's principle of hegemony is far from self-evident,⁸ and several other researchers have recently questioned the conventional periodization of his work, with a certain arbitrary (though politically significant) divide made between the writings and practice of his activist period (up to 1926) and the *Prison Notebooks*.⁹ A careful reading with a view to noting the remodelling, rectification and deepening of concepts as a function of political practice and the problems posed by the historical conjunctures of the class struggle makes a division of this kind untenable.

Contrary to the numerous studies that still see *The Southern Question* as the point at which the concept of hegemony emerged, it is possible to show that this concept, already operative in practice in the *Ordine Nuovo* period, was developed theoretically as early as 1924. True, at this time it was still inseparably linked with the notion of proletarian dictatorship, the conception of the party, and its relations with the working class and the masses. And right through till 1929 (*Notebook 1*), the concept of hegemony is not supplemented by the equally strategic (and somewhat obscured) concept of hegemonic apparatus. It is true, moreover, that in the *Prison Notebooks* Gramsci moves from an analysis of hegemony in terms of class relations to an analysis of hegemony in terms of the state, since the state, in the full sense of the term, is defined as 'hegemony protected by the armour of coercion'. But these are examples of a perpetual restructuring of concepts and their political implications, from 1919 through to 1935.

The 1926 dividing line is even less tenable if some attention is paid to the 'prehistory' of the concept of hegemony. Contrary to what is maintained in certain rather hasty surveys, this notion was well established in Marxist usage throughout the Third International. It can be found in Lenin's writings both before and after 1917. It is also to be found frequently in the work of Béla Kun, Varga, Stalin and especially Bukharin, who used it in a sense that might appear close to Gramsci's. We are consequently faced with the task of redefining more precisely what Gramsci's specific contribution was, a contribution that involved the exploration of a new road to socialism in the developed capitalist countries: the 'war of position' that requires 'an unprecedented concentration of hegemony'.

It can never be sufficiently stressed, therefore, that 'reading means practising a problematic'.¹⁰ For this to be materialist, and to take a class standpoint on Gramsci's work, it is necessary to clear up the ambiguities and remove once and for all the artificial barriers that divide the *Prison Notebooks* from Gramsci's Political Writings and from the Third International.

II

Assuming that this is achieved, the method to be followed in reconstructing a political-theoretical reading of Gramsci presents certain initial difficulties. Even if it were possible to reconstruct all the political debates conducted in prison, and even if more precise material could be obtained as to the information that Gramsci had available to him, the fact still remains that his notes very frequently mingle reflection on the past, investigation of the present and determination of future tasks, in a conception of time that is in no way linear. And this in a situation of generalized dialogue that is characteristic of Gramsci:

I generally find it necessary to take up a dialectical or dialogic standpoint, otherwise I don't feel any intellectual stimulation. As I once told you, I don't like to throw stones into the dark; I like to be faced with a concrete partner or opponent.¹¹

The conditions imposed by the fascist prison, moreover, i.e. the lack of certain political texts, of precise documents and books, and the need to encode Marxist concepts for reasons of censorship, meant that Gramsci's philosophical and political reflection was constructed and unified by way of his opponents (Croce, Gentile or Bukharin) and

We would fall subtly back into a simple reduction of Marxism to Croce's celebrated 'canon of historical investigation', depriving it of its philosophical and theoretical vigour.

Gramsci's long struggle against Croce and all forms of revisionism, his restoration and later deepening of the revolutionary dialectic, indicate a completely different path.

The *Prison Notebooks* are to be 'read' as a continuation of Leninism, in different historical conditions and with different political conclusions. This means that any attempt to oppose Gramsci to Lenin, whether on the Left as for some, or on the Right as for others, any reading that obscures the theoretical and historical novelty of Leninism, can in our view lead only to a new form of idealism. But – and it is a big 'but' – to continue Lenin means a productive and creative relationship that can never be exhausted in the mere application of Leninism by studious pupils, but involves its translation and development. This nuance is of capital importance, underlining the fact that the only 'orthodoxy' permissible is that of the revolution.

In the *Prison Notebooks*, in fact, Gramsci takes up all the problems raised by Lenin, as well as all those that he was faced with himself in the years 1919–20: the problems of the party, its relations to the working class and to the masses, the problem of the hegemony of the working class, the critique of economism, the definition of a crisis, whether revolutionary or organic, etc. But he takes these up from a specific perspective, in conformity with a profound intuition of his own: the victory of fascism, with all that this implied, meant that the workers' movement was forced to define its socialist politics, for a more or less protracted period, in terms that were relatively new in relation to the October Revolution. It is useless to conceal these problems: Gramsci himself underwent an evolution, and also in relation to his analysis of the state in *Ordine Nuovo*. Without this historical and political distance, Gramsci's itinerary would end up being reducible to mere toying with political formulae, seductive perhaps, but ultimately facile. . . . In 1919–20, when revolution seemed on the agenda, Gramsci struggled for the foundation of a state of a new type, on the model of the Soviets. But in 1930, or in 1935?

This small example is sufficient to show that the question of the state and its relation to society as a whole, to social classes, is what seems decisive for us in elucidating Gramsci's materialism, even at the cost of noting certain of its historical or philosophical limitations. By a singular reversal, this change of perspective finally rebounds on the Gramscian

incorporation into it of the apparatus of class hegemony, is the dialectical condition that opens the way to a Leninist reprise of the necessary thesis of the withering away of the state in communism.

The final point of this work, then, is to locate Gramsci's contribution to the Marxist theory of the state, on the basis of his analysis of specific states (e.g. his constant reflection on the crisis of 1929, the 'American model', the nature of the fascist state).

IV

In all these questions, it is impossible to avoid a debate with certain tendencies in political sociology, as well as with the critical interpretation of Gramsci proposed in *Reading Capital*. This latter choice is not an arbitrary one, in that many of Althusser's theses were developed in the context of a particularly ambiguous relationship to Gramsci. Althusser sought to reject all Gramsci's philosophical positions (historicism, philosophy of praxis, humanism), while still always assessing as positive Gramsci's discoveries in the field of scientific materialism: the organic intellectuals, the concept of hegemony and finally his approach to the state.

This rather clumsy dividing line, in our view, conceals something quite different; Gramsci's theses burrow into those of Althusser, but with certain shifts that all bear on a single blind spot, the science of political practice. As Leonardo Paggi showed a few years ago,²⁰ this intransigent critique of historicism as a form of idealism enabled Althusser to transpose the field of analysis and investigate the 'philosophy of praxis' itself in new terms. In this sense, it has had a liberating effect in Italy, and without leading to any 'theoreticist' or structuralist pitfalls, in as much as it opened a road still little explored on the relations between philosophy and science, and suggested that Gramsci's philosophy should be investigated otherwise than in his work on Croce – in fact in Gramsci's politics as a whole.

Between Gramsci's explicit philosophical positions, in fact, and the philosophy 'implicit' in his politics, between his theoretical project and the cultural instruments he had at his disposal for carrying this through, there are indeed certain gaps which a 'religious' reading of his work overlooks. If the philosophy of praxis, in its novelty, does point to theses for the production of new knowledge, politics conversely realizes philosophy and gives it its real content. This sums up the entire purpose of this book, to explain this union of politics and philosophy (the

problematic as a whole: it calls into question the status of philosophy, and the lateral shift within the Notebooks from the expansion of the concept of intellectual to the expansion of the concept of state. To the point that:

In politics the error occurs as a result of an inaccurate understanding of what the State (in its integral meaning: dictatorship + hegemony) really is.¹⁹

The present book was already finished when I was able, thanks to the kind help of Valentino Gerratana, to consult the chronological and complete edition of the *Notebooks*, while still in proof, and in particular to work on the first, previously unpublished, *Notebooks* (first drafts). If it is still far too early to progress to a systematic and comparative reading of the different versions, it was at least possible to gain a bit more precision on the progressive emergence of questions and concepts, and to date the central foci of Gramsci's investigations; to reinstate the time factor and Gramsci's rhythm of thought, and advance certain elements, if still in a fragmentary state, for a political and intellectual 'autobiography' of Gramsci in prison. This task is all the more indispensable in as much as it makes it finally possible to answer a quite basic question, that of the connections between the prison conversations held in Turi in late 1930 and Gramsci's political-theoretical work. In my view, it is clear from the chronology of Gramsci's work in 1930–32, which we shall present in due course, that the critique of economism (late 1930), of Bukharin (particularly 1931), the work of recasting Marxist philosophy (1931–32) and that on the party and Machiavelli (begun in late summer 1930) are all *long-term responses to the problems of the workers' movement of the time*.

Gramsci's response to these questions involves an astonishing combination, in the same period of time, of two projects that are customarily quite separate: research into the state, and research into Marxist philosophy in its relationship to the masses. Indeed, these two problems mutually affect one another in so original a way that Gramsci's major contribution can be seen particularly in this. For they both converge in a single reformulation of the concept of the state in its relation with society. By rejecting any kind of instrumental model of the state as the weapon of a ruling class endowed with consciousness and will, Gramsci not only avoids the characteristic political blockage of the Second International, but also escapes the problematic of the state as violence, the basis in fact of Stalinist theory and practice in this field. In this sense, Gramsci's expansion of the concept of the state, his

gnoseology of politics') by treating philosophy in its superstructural location (as theory of the apparatus of philosophical hegemony) and treating politics as productive of knowledge.

It has often been noted how, for Gramsci, the hegemony of the working class in the West, its capacity to weld together a system of alliances with a view to holding power, involves two related conditions: a deepening of the state that breaks with any economistic interpretation of Marxism, and the recasting of Marxist philosophy itself. This offers a new relationship between theory and politics that avoids the alternative that has for long faced 'Marxism' in the West: on the one hand Stalinism, on the other hand its reversal, whether critical or complete, into what passes for Western Marxism. In the first case, philosophy becomes a mere political instrument, never producing any knowledge for politics since it is already a political ideology. In the second, philosophy offers itself, in a reactivated Hegelian model, as the 'critical truth' of politics: the intellectuals, possessing the philosophical totality of truth (at the expense of the sciences), set themselves up as *arbiters* of real political struggles.

This relationship is a false one. Philosophy must produce knowledge for politics, without cutting itself off from the objective and scientific investigation of the world. Is it not precisely because Gramsci avoids this double trap, not situating himself on that ground, that his philosophical practice can speak to us today? In a very different conjuncture of the class struggle, in the thick of the very difficult turn of the 1930s, and with the intellectual instruments of that time, he undertook a novel task: to recast Marxist philosophy in the light of Leninism, but also to do so by confronting it with the cultural, political and historical experiences of the European workers' movement, and the Italian workers' movement in particular.

This historical task cannot be perceived in its full dimensions without taking into account the development of Marxism after Gramsci, in particular the theoretical advances of the present. The reader should not be surprised, therefore, to find here certain veiled criticisms of a work such as *Reading Capital*. The critique of theoreticism that Althusser undertook in his *Elements of Self-Criticism*, I believe, demands a new approach to Gramsci. The present work can in fact be read as a *double symptomatic reading* of both Althusser and Gramsci. Of Althusser, in as much as his critique of Gramscian historicism on the basis of a supposed common matrix shared by all historicism (from Sartre back to Lukács or Gramsci), illuminating as it may well be on the weight of

Hegelianism in Marxism, appears to me quite untenable. And of Gramsci, in as much as certain of Althusser's theses will serve here as a foothold or a theoretical stimulus in a new questioning of certain aspects of Gramsci's work. I should note that what I adhere to here from Althusser's work is essentially his critique of economism, his theoretical concern to expand the concept of the state (the theory of the ideological state apparatuses, even if the hegemonic apparatus in the Gramscian sense cannot be reduced to this), and the status of philosophy in its decisive relationship to the class struggle.²¹

We shall see concrete evidence that:

A man of politics writes about philosophy: it could be that his 'true' philosophy should be looked for rather in his writings on politics.²²


Here Gramsci converges with another materialist dialectician, to whom he is often in fact very close:

One can know things to the extent that one changes them (Bertolt Brecht).


I owe particular thanks to Valentino Gerratana; without his friendly help, this book would have been very different. In permitting me to consult the proofs of the chronological and complete edition of the *Prison Notebooks*, which he has spent many years preparing and which is to be published by Einaudi in spring 1975, he enabled me to enrich, sharpen and sometimes correct my own working hypotheses. In the firm conviction that thanks to his work and that of his team Gramscian interpretation will be given a major renewal, I submit my own reflections as a contribution to a future research that will, as always, be both individual and collective.

I have also been able in the course of this year to discuss at considerable length with Leonardo Paggi, Franco Ferri and Luciano Gruppi. I take the opportunity of thanking them for their suggestions, as well as all those others who have helped me to a better understanding of Italy today. I should perhaps say, to discover a certain Italy, the Italy of such great social and political struggles, where the celebrated union so deeply studied by Gramsci is taking place, in the current conditions created by capitalism: the union of the industrial North and the Mezzogiorno, the town and the country, the working class and the exploited masses.

October 1974



Three pages at the start of one of the notebooks which Gramsci set aside for translation contain some exercises in the English language—two of them are reproduced here. These pages are the only record of Gramsci's effort to learn



English. His study of foreign languages, to which he devoted considerable time while in prison, was directed primarily at improving his knowledge of German and Russian.

A DAILY LECTURE FROM MARCUS STEINWEG

61st Lecture at the Gramsci Monument, The Bronx, NYC: 29th August 2013

THE SUBJECT OF ART

Marcus Steinweg

1. How is the place of the art work within the social field to be determined?
2. How do the production of art, art criticism, art studies, and philosophy relate to one another?
3. Is there a political commission for an artwork?
4. Is art necessarily critical—critical of institutions, the market, ideology?
5. Or does an artwork put certain limits upon criticism and its good conscience, which make of it a risky, necessarily affirmative practice?
6. Does its sense lie in these categories of resistance and subversion invariably associated with the artwork, but also in a self-calming that enables the artist to participate in the political game without genuine commitment, so that political consciousness takes on the function of a depoliticization that has not been admitted?
7. How affirmative must an artwork be in order to be subversive or political?
8. In order to be an assertion of form and truth, art and philosophy must refuse the "order of real politics."¹
9. That is the order of the possible, of pragmatism and its practical cleverness, of situational intelligence.
10. It is the order of *phrónesis*, as Aristotle says, the dimension of diplomatic reason. Aristotle calls *phrónesis* intelligence in particularity, in unfreedom, intelligence that operates in relation to the situation in which it decides and acts.
11. As Hans-Georg Gadamer ceaselessly underscored, it is the principle of hermeneutics, reason that ponders and weighs up.
12. That brings it close to the pragmatic estimation of *doxá*, of sound common sense.
13. Art and philosophy have an inherent absolute resistance to *doxá* and *phrónesis* because they compel the subject to decelerate, to brake itself, to renounce power.
14. Philosophy and art want to erect the subject as a power of assertion that resists defusing by *doxá* and *phrónesis*.
15. The subject truly decides and acts only by neglecting its situation, ignoring and transcending it by puncturing the texture of facts.
16. Subject is nothing other than the name for this puncturing and hyperbole, which it necessarily represents.
17. Hence the mistrust of a subject of such self-authorization because it resists its own defusing by the spirit of facts.

FEEDBACK

The climax of the Antonio Gramsci monument

In a conversation with Forest Houses Tenant Association President, Mr. Erik Farmer the subject of Hispanic resident participation came up.

In an article of the Gramsci News Paper dated and captioning a picture of Philosopher and writer, Heiner Muller. There appeared a Feed Back article dated Saturday, August 3, 2013. The article cited that the neighborhood where the Monument is erected; "has a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual resident population, where 56% are Hispanics".

Mr. Erik Farmer indicated to me that he didn't know why more Hispanics didn't come out.

Music and Dance is a powerful Art form thought-out the world. Since the opening of the Antonio Gramsci Monument not one Spanish artist has had their recording aired by D.J. baby Dee. I think that the climax of the next three weeks should include Mexican Mariachi Music as it is the most popular among all Spanish Speaking residents, and Countries.

United Sates Supreme Court Justices, Thurgood Marshall, Clarence Thomas, and Justice, Sonia Sotomayor (Sotomayor is from the Bronx and public Housing) would think it's a good Thing as would all Hispanic residents of Forest Houses and the City of New York as a whole.

Let's include all an exclude none, as in the spirit of the late Civil Rights leader, the Rev. Dr. King Martin Luther King, Jr


This feed back article submitted by resident Mr. Santos Perez

Thursday, August 29, 2013

ERRATA (ERROR IN PRINTING ON COVER OF ISSUE NO. 60)

CORRECT TITLE:

"THREE (LONG) MARCHES, THREE MOMENTS OF CRISIS: 1963, 1983, 2013"



RESIDENTS OF THE DAY



HADJA KEITA
BINDOU KONNEH